A major reason why Warriors of the Golden State struggled to generate offense against the San Antonio Spurs two days ago it was because of a clumsy infraction. You can point to two things as the culprit: 1) a starting lineup consisting of three non-spacers (Trayce Jackson-Davis, Draymond Green and Jonathan Kuminga) and two ball handlers at both guard spots (Chris Paul and Brandin). Podziemski); 2) settle for stagnant isolation possessions that did little to move the Spurs defense and made their job easier in terms of stops.
Despite the absence of Steph Curry – the undisputed engine of this offense who makes life much easier on that end – the Warriors had to stick to their identity of constant ball and player movement against a team that had some struggling to defend this season. , especially without their best defender in the person of Victor Wembanyama. They finally managed to put together some semblance of a good offense in the second half of this game – but other problems emerged, particularly on the defensive end.
So it was quite telling that Steve Kerr decided to move away from the starting lineup that not only cut down the field in half-court situations, but also lacked a true scoring option that could alleviate part of spacing and shot creation. problems. He sidelined Podziemski and started Klay Thompson in his place, while relegating Jackson-Davis to the bench and putting Andrew Wiggins back as the starter. Green moved to the five in the Warriors’ classic small-ball setup.
In theory, this formation was intended to increase tempo, create more fast break situations and maximize opportunities to catch the Spurs on their heels. Forcing stops would be crucial – it would allow the Warriors to immediately call the break and take advantage of a team scrambling to come back and set up their half-court defense.
Even from made buckets, the mobile nature of the lineup allowed them to quickly pick up the pace and get to the other end – before a generational defender could get back to the wall:
But while the pace and mobility of the lineup played a significant role in the Warriors’ offense this time around, arguably the biggest reason for the rejuvenation was the emphasis on plays that forced the Spurs to defend – as mentioned above, something the Warriors had. adapting to what they had done in their previous meeting, but at a time when it was too little, too late.
Part of the reason Kerr decided to cast Jackson-Davis last time out was to take advantage of his synergy with Paul on on-screen actions. Without the presence of a high-level plan creator, the next best options on paper were:
- Use Thompson’s gravity on the ball to generate advantages on sets of movements.
- Running ball screen plays for Paul to get him into his spot and put pressure on the Spurs pick-and-roll defense.
Kerr’s ability to make plays after stops and after timeouts is an underrated and understated part of his coaching. He usually uses Curry as a sort of decoy/screen on his drawn sets; without him, Thompson naturally fits into the combined role of advantage generator, shot creator and decoy/screener.
In the “Delay” action below (where the floor is reversed and Green is placed in the passer role at the top of the key) – initiated by a wing handoff before the ball gets to Green in order to move defense and keep them on their heels – Thompson comes out of a pindown, followed by receiving the ball from Green on a dribble handoff (collectively called the “Chicago” action).
The force and pace of the action fuels the play. Thompson’s defender rushes to pursue him, while Wembanyama can’t commit to helping as he has to keep an eye on Green’s roll. This allows Thompson to separate himself from his scrambling defender – and allows him to create space for a mid-range jumper:
On another set – this time, a baseline out-of-bounds (BLOB) possession – Kerr tweaks a play called “Rub” for Thompson, who tucks the ball in, receives a baseline screen and “zipper” works his way to the top . of the arc. He comes off a screen from Kuminga, who takes advantage of the attention Thompson is receiving to slide and weave his way to the rim for an easy dunk:
The Warriors’ other method of putting pressure on the Spurs defense — ball-protective plays with Paul as the ball handler — also stood out.
Kerr previously stated his desire to incorporate more of the actions Paul loved to take. Throughout this season, Paul has shown a particular preference for two specific ball screen concepts:
- “Stack/Spain” pick-and-roll
- Action “Pistol/21”
With Wembanyama back to anchor the Spurs’ defense, the Warriors needed to keep him away from half-court actions as much as possible, with a particular emphasis on covering Wembanyama’s baseline drops.
Paul’s first favorite action listed above – the “Stack” pick-and-roll, or more commonly known as the “Spain” pick-and-roll – is specifically designed to counter drop coverage. Paul calls out to “Stack” by literally stacking his fists. This triggers the typical ball screen action, with the addition of a back screen from Podziemski on Wembanyama, which allows Paul to come off the ball screen and hit his elbow sweet spot.
The Spurs try to change the action, but Paul has enough space and time to drill a vintage mid-range jumper:
As for the second action – “Pistol”, also called “21” – it involves a ball screen action on the wing. The particular variation of the ‘Pistol’ that Paul used against Spurs is the ‘Nash’ action, where the ball is passed to Paul on the wing. The passer follows his pass and sets a ball screen for Paul, who then comes out of another ball screen set by the five in what is virtually a double screen set.
The passer who passes the ball to Paul on the wing and sets the first screen (Podziemski) is important in this configuration:
Podziemski remaining on the spot after setting the screen forces his defender to stick to him, which eliminates a “tag” on Jackson-Davis’ throw. Add in the fact that Paul’s defender falls behind after being forced to navigate between screens, and Zach Collins finds himself on an island, virtually defending a 2-on-1. This allows Paul to easily find Jackson-Davis on the alley-oop.
A typical way for defenses to defend double ball screens is to change the initial screen. On another “Nash” action possession, the Spurs attempt to pass to Paul to take away the roll option – but the execution is shoddy. The change is late, allowing Paul to enter his comfort zone and drill a mid-range jump:
The emphasis on Paul-fueled ball-screen actions was prevalent and stood out easily — to the point where sets the Warriors don’t usually run made appearances.
This is a matchup you don’t see much from them, but one that other teams incorporate into their offense. Paul calls out “45,” which is the typical call for high “horn” ball screens. This involves two ball screens facing each other, giving the ball handler two options for breaking away.
Naturally, Paul chooses to step off the Jackson-Davis staged screen, which places Wembanyama in the pick-and-roll action:
With Jackson-Davis able to catch Paul’s man on the screen, Wembanyama has to step up a little higher – which also means the lob window for Paul to get the ball to Jackson-Davis opens.
The Warriors’ offense without Curry will still be an adventure — but that doesn’t mean they should be completely inept without him. A slight change in approach, suited to the personnel available, was all the Warriors needed to put together an offensive attack that should have been enough to defeat a low-level team.
This change in approach manifested itself as a healthy balance of sticking to their ball/player movement identity and incorporating ball screen action for a pick maestro -and-roll.
